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Abstract 
The adoption of Sharia law and the creation of an Islamic government are prominent motivations for religious 
terrorism within the current climate. Throughout history, Nigeria has been exposed to ethno religious violence 
and political discontent and has recently seen an escalation in associated violence threatening its sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, peace and stability. This paper explores Boko Haram, a Nigerian Islamist sect, responsible 
for numerous attacks in northern and central Nigeria on infrastructure and people. The origins and ideological 
motivations of this group are examined and compared to the current wave of religious terrorism in relation to 
tactics, leadership and objectives. Parallels and relationships are drawn between Boko Haram and other 
proscribed terrorist organizations such as al-Qa’ida, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the 
Somalian al Shabaab. This paper defines Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, as opposed to religious 
fanatics or freedom fighters, other common views about this group. This paper takes an Australian legislative 
approach to defining terrorism and terrorist organizations and examines Boko Haram against a contemporary 
terrorist organization proscribed by the Australian Government, AQIM, to substantiate claims that this 
organization demonstrates features common among terrorist organizations. Future prospects of this group, 
including potential expansion and listing them as a terrorist organization by the Australian government for 
national security, are presented.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Boko Haram can be understood as an Islamist insurgency that has risen from political and religious discontent 
within Nigeria (Adasoji, 2011; Onuoha, 2012; Soloman, 2012). This extremist sect threatens the security, 
sovereignty and stability of Nigeria, particularly northern Nigeria, by a range of high profile attacks on the 
military, police, schools, political figures and other infrastructure (Nicoll, 2011; Think Security Africa, 2011). 
Group evolution and differing interpretations regarding motivations, presented challenges in defining this group 
from a local, national and international perspective (Walker, 2012). From various viewpoints Boko Haram can 
be considered as; a terrorist organization, freedom fighters or religious fanatics. Through an examination of the 
origins and philosophy of Boko Haram, comparisons with established terrorist organizations such as AQIM, and 
against the Australian definition of terrorism, Boko Haram can be described as a terrorist organization with both 
political and religious motives. Providing that intelligence continues to support links and cooperation between 
Boko Haram and other proscribed terrorist organizations, listing the group as a terrorist organization in the near 
future is necessary for an international counter-terrorism approach and to continue to secure Australian interests 
at home and abroad in the future (Adesoji, 2011; Devlin-Foltz, 2010; US House of Representatives Committee, 
2011).  
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Origins and philosophy of Boko Haram 
 
Boko Haram are a Nigerian militant Islamist sect which seeks political and religious reform within Nigeria 
specifically the adoption of Sharia law with beliefs based in the practise of Orthodox Islam (Bagaji et al, 2012 ; 
Onuoha, 2012; Soloman, 2012; Walker, 2012). This interpretation of Islam abhors and rejects western 
civilisation and education as sacrilegious and the name ‘Boko Haram’ derives from this belief (Adasoji, 2011; 
Anonymous, 2009; Onuoha, 2012; Soloman, 2012). This fanatical Islamist sect recruits from the northern 
provinces of Nigeria targeting disaffected youths, unemployed university students and street children 
(Almajiris) by addressing grievances and radicalises its members (Nicoll, 2011; Onuoha, 2012). This group 
threatens Nigeria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, peace and stability by targeting symbols of authority within 
Nigeria as well as committing a broad range of crimes such as robberies and acts of vandalism, however, their 
influence appears localised at this stage with developing operational links to international terrorists 
organizations in relation to training (Anonymous, 2011; Roti, 2012; Think Security Africa, 2011a; University of 
Nigeria, 2012; US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Counterterroism and Intelligence, 2011).  
  
Boko Haram manifested post the independence of Nigeria in 1960 which saw a shift of power to the Christian 
south, the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 which saw Sharia law adopted, the return of civil rule and 
democracy in Nigeria in 1999, as well as a strong promotion of orthodoxy and Wahhabi doctrine in the 1990’s 
within Sub-Saharan Africa (Adasoji, 2011; Nicoll, 2011; Soloman, 2012). Within Nigeria, religion has played a 
crucial part in politics and society pre and post-independence, with religion and state seemingly inseparable, 
therefore in the last three decades Nigeria has experienced recurrent religious and ethno-religious hostilities and 
conflicts (Bagaji et al, 2012; Isichei, 1987). Boko Haram can be seen to have risen out of a change in political 
landscape and sponsored by political discontent with political and religious aims (Anonymous, n.d; Bagaji et al, 
2012; Walker, 2012). 
 
The Nigerian Director of Defence Information, Colonel Mohammed Yerima, has identified that the emergence 
of Boko Haram originated as early as 1995 under various names, such as Ahlulsunna wal’ jama’ah hijra, 
however rose to notoriety in 2009 (Onuoha, 2012; Soloman, 2012). This group originated by the creation of a 
separatist community that espoused hard-line Islamic principles after embarking on a Hirja. However they soon 
evolved into a group that were perpetrating many acts of violence (Walker, 2012). Boko Haram, or ‘People 
committed to the Prophets teaching for Propagation and Jihad,’ was founded by Muslim cleric Mohammed 
Yusuf and operates in the North-eastern states of Nigeria, primarily Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe (Adasoji, 
2011; Onuoha, 2012; Think Security Africa, 2011b).  Locals refer to the sect as the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ (Thin 
Africa, 2011a). Since 2009 and the death of their leader, attacks perpetrated by this group have grown in 
lethality and sophistication and the group has become increasingly cell-like in structure, killing 253 people in 
January 2012 (Soloman, 2012; Think Security Africa, 2011; Walker, 2012). The sect has engaged in targeted 
killings, kidnappings, shootings, fire bombings, bombings including IED’s, VBIEDS and suicide bombing 
(Onuoha, 2012; Think Security Africa, 2011b; Walker, 2012). Target selection has evolved from a focus on 
Nigerian Security Forces to also include politicians, military, police, critical infrastructure, civilians, 
government infrastructure, schools, churches and a UN building (Gruenbaum , 2009; Soloman, 2012; Think 
Security Africa, 2011b). There is a synergy between the tactics and targets of Boko Haram to their objectives, 
for example the assassination of a candidate for the governor of Borno from the All Nigeria People’s Party 
whose beliefs did not align with the political objectives of this group (Nicoll, 2011; Think Security Africa, 
2011b). 
Defining terrorism and examining Boko Haram from an Australian Perspective 
 
An act of terrorism as defined by the Commonwealth of Australian Government under the Criminal Code Act 
1995 Section 100.1 and the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act (C’th) 2002, Part 5.3, Terrorist 
Division 100, would consider Boko Haram to have committed acts of terrorism under sub section 2, 2b and 2c 
but not sub Section 2a of the legislation. They have intended to advance a religious and political cause by 
committing act 2b under this section (that is orthodox Islamism and the establishment of Sharia law), and have 
done these actions with the intent of influencing by intimidation a government and the public, thus 
demonstrating an act of 2c (by aiming to intimidate the Nigerian government to creating Sharia law and 
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intimidate the Christian public) (Adasoji, 2011; Nicoll, 2011; Soloman, 2012). Boko Haram have also fulfilled 
sub Section 2 by causing serious harm that is physical harm to a person (Anonymous, 2009; Onuoha, 2012). 
Acts committed by this group have not been advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action that is not intended to 
cause serious harm that is physical harm to a person.  From this perspective the Australian definition disregards 
the idea they are freedom fighters, average criminals or religious fanatics, alternative arguments regarding the 
definition of Boko Haram (Fischer, 2011). Although taken from an Australia perspective it is important to 
understand that defining terrorism is a matter of perspective, with over 100 definitions worldwide, however 
essentially most definitions involve the inclusion of elements such as; the use of violence, targets non-
combatants, creates a state of fear, aims to influence, intimidate or coerce and being motivated by political, 
social and ideological objectives (Aly, 2011). Boko Haram’s actions would be considered terrorism under most 
definitions that present these core elements. 
As an organization and defined in section 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code, Boko Haram would meet the 
requirements to be defined and proscribed as a terrorist organization. There is evidence Boko Haram have 
engaged in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the perpetration of terrorist acts (Anonymous, 2009; 
Security in Nigeria, 2011; Walker, 2012). Boko Haram however is not proscribed as a terrorist organization by 
the Australian Government. Defining Boko Haram as a terrorist organization would assist in an international 
counter terrorism approach and securing Australia’s security, Australian’s and Australian interests nationally 
and internationally in the future. The Australian Counter Terrorism White Paper (2010) identifies a real and 
enduring threat from international terrorism in the form of violent jihadist movements to Australia 
compromising predominately of groups associated with al-Qa’ida and similar views (Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, 2010). Scholars, Algerian Intelligence and the Nigerian government have identified that 
Boko Haram have participated in training with, and has links to, extremist groups such as AQIM and al Shabaab 
in Somalia (US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism 
and Intelligence, 2011). There is a potential, based on intelligence produced by Algerian intelligence, 
supporting the fact that the group could become an incubator for international terrorism, expand, join the global 
jihadist movement and associate with al-Qa’ida (Adesoji, 2011; Devlin-Foltz, 2010; Onuoha, 2012; Solomon, 
2012; US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism and 
Intelligence, 2011). The White Paper in 2010 acknowledged the rise of affiliated groups within new areas such 
as Yemen and Somalia that have offset counter-terrorism success in other areas internationally, and Algerian 
government intelligence has highlighted links with Boko Haram and Somalian al Shabaab (Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010; House of Representatives, 2011). Until late 2011 the international 
community did not acknowledge the threat of Boko Haram to international interests, however a report issued in 
November 2011 by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, highlighted Boko Haram’s intent and capability to attack western interests 
(Adesoji, 2011; US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Counterterroism and Intelligence, 2011).  
 
Identification and proscription of Boko Haram within Nigeria as a terrorist organization can influence the 
success of Australia’s efforts to curb terrorism internationally by early detection and prevention. Boko Haram’s 
actions have security implications internationally, regionally and locally and there is a need for identification of 
this threat and mitigation through counter terrorism efforts (Adesoji, 2011; Onuoha, 2012). There is real 
potential for Boko Haram to join transnational jihadist movements providing an international security threat, as 
well as providing an avenue for the radicalisation of African nationals within Australia, especially with an 
increase in the of use of the internet by Boko Haram, with the internet being a popular tool in informing, 
indoctrinating and radicalising individuals (Aly, 2011; Adesoji, 2011; Onuoha, 2012; US House of 
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism and Intelligence, 2011). 
Australia already has a bilateral relationship with Nigeria and also provides aid for social and sustainable 
economic development for communities fostering international cooperation (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 2008). According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics there are approximately 3646 Nigerian-born 
residents within Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Africa has also increased in importance in 
relation to Australia’s migration scheme with 248,699 African born residents within Australia recorded in the 
2006 census (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009). The Counter-Terrorism White Paper has also identified the 
threat of people raised in Australia becoming influenced by the jihadist message and generating attacks locally 
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010).  
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Comparison of Boko Haram and Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)  
As identified in the Criminal Code Act 1995 Section 102.1(1) a terrorist organization can be listed in 
accordance with a proscription process set out in sub sections 102.1(2),(3) and (4).  The Australian government 
has documented under the Criminal Code Regulations 2002 Schedule 1 a list of proscribed terrorist 
organizations. AQIM is a proscribed terrorist organization by the Australian government and can be compared 
to Boko Haram for the purpose of illustrating similarities and the future need for Boko Haram to be proscribed. 
Further this comparison is fruitful as intelligence from Algerian intelligence identifies coordination between 
these groups (Australian Government [National Security], 2010; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security, 2011; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009, US House of Representatives Committee on 
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism and Intelligence 2011). Factors for proscription through 
this legislation include engagement in terrorism, ideology and links to other terrorist groups or networks, links 
to Australia, threats to Australian interests, proscription by the UN or likeminded countries and engagement in 
peace/mediation processes (House of Representatives Committee, 2006). In relation to listing organizations, 
Boko Haram does engage in terrorism, intelligence has shown links to other terrorist groups and networks as 
part of a global jihadist movement, AQIM and Somalia al Shabaab, and has no links to Australia or Australian 
interests comparable to AQIM at this stage, however there is the potential (Australian Government [National 
Security], 2011; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 2011; Walker, 2012). Boko 
Haram however has demonstrated a threat to western interests as detailed in the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence (2011) report on Boko 
Haram. Three of Boko Haram’s members are also listed by the United States as Specially Designated Global 
Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 (Adedoja, 2012; Lobe, 2012; Oluarotimi , 2012; Starr, 
2012).  
As a group, both organizations have similar motivation, being fundamentalist militant Islamist groups, and use 
violence to achieve religious and political objectives of creating an Islamic state with Sharia law (Australian 
Government [National Security], 2010; Jones, 2005; Soloman, 2012). This is identified in the Australian 
National Counter Terrorism White Paper with the global Islamist movement being a threat to security interests 
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010). Both groups can also be seen to coerce or influence by 
intimidation their respective governments in aim to advance their causes (Australian Government [National 
Security], 2010; Soloman, 2012). However their modus operandi can be seen to differentiate, with AQIM 
prominent within Algeria and the Shahel region of northern Mali and with ties to a larger al-Qa’ida network 
while Boko Haram consists of much smaller loose cell networks within a faction of a country (Australian 
Government [National Security], 2010; Onuoha, 2012). Both groups tactics are consistent with the tactics 
utilised by the religious wave of terrorism that employs suicide bombings and mass casualty attacks, however 
their general targets differentiate with AQIM also targeting western symbols and influences in Algeria, Mali 
and Niger as well as Algerian government and military interests, and Boko Haram targeting Nigerian interests, 
infrastructure and symbols of authority (Australian Government [National Security], 2010; Rapoport, 2003; US 
House of Representatives, 2011; Walker, 2012). The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities of 
United States Africa Command has provided intelligence that members of Boko Haram have trained with 
AQIM (US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism and 
Intelligence, 2011). It can be seen that both groups display characteristics of the current wave of religious 
terrorism and possess similarities, however on organizational scale, capacity and transnationalism nature AQIM 
can be seen to be more advanced than Boko Haram (Walker, 2012). AQIM can also be seen to harbor stronger 
anti-west ideals (Walker, 2012). Boko Haram has the capacity, if it continues coordinating with transnational 
organizations such as al-Qa’ida, to pose a similar security threat to Australia as AQIM, particularly if a stronger 
international anti-west sentiment is adopted as western interests have already been targeted by the attack on the 
UN headquarters in Nigeria in 2011 (Adesoji, 2011; US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 
Security Subcommittee on Counterterroism and Intelligence 2011).  
Boko Haram within the historical context of terrorist organizations  
 
Terrorism can be placed contextually throughout history by various sects to achieve objectives through the use 
of violence (Aly, 2011; Hoffman, 1998; Lutz & Lutz, 2008; Rasler & Thomspon, 2009). The modern 
manifestation of terrorism can be described and contextualised by Rapoport’s four waves of modern terrorism 
activity to assist with understanding terrorism within a global environment focusing on ideological motivations 
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(Aly, 2011). Each wave is distinguished by political and social circumstances within the international 
environment, patterns in objectives and tactics as well as impact on social and political structures and can be 
used to support the notion that Boko Haram are indeed a terrorist organization as they illustrate elements 
associated with the fourth religious wave of terrorism (Aly, 2011; Rapoport, 2003; Rasler & Thompson, 2009).   
 
Boko Haram can be seen to exhibit similar tactics and motivations as the current wave of terrorism ‘religious’. 
Religion acts as an ideological force, legitimiser and unifier of this group and aims to achieve one of the three 
primary religious goals; establishment of a religiously pure state, establish religious governments or destruction 
of Earth (Aly, 2011; Gregg, 2004; Johnson, 2011; Rapoport, 2003; Rasler & Thompson, 2009 ). Boko Haram 
can be understood to aspire to achieve the creation of a religious government via religious reform (Onuoha, 
2012; Solomon, 2012). Religious terrorists such as al-Qa’ida are inspired by interpretations of a text that 
commands the creation of religious rule, in relation to Boko Haram this can be seen as the Qur’an and orthodox 
militant Islamism via the assertion of Sharia law (Aly, 2011; Gregg, 2004).Tactics utilised in this wave heavily 
involve the use of mass casualty attacks and suicide bombing, characteristic of the tactics used by Boko Haram 
(Anonymous, 2012; McConnell, 2012; Rapoport, 2003; Rasler & Thompson, 2009). This aligns with religious 
views and objectives in relation to Islam ‘martyrdom’ (Rapoport, 1984). Groups within the ‘religious wave’ 
organizational structure involve members with the same religious interpretation and include a spiritual leader, 
distinct from other waves organizational structure to which is parallel to the structure of Boko Haram (Aly, 
2011; Security in Nigeria, 2011). Other sects within this wave as identified by Rapoport (2003) include al-
Qa’ida and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). In a pre-modern context parallels can be drawn with Boko Haram and the 
Assassins (1090-1275 AD) which also targeted prominent political and state figures that didn’t recognise their 
version of Islam in aim to establish an Islamic state (Aly, 2011; Horsely, 1979). A comparison of Boko Haram 
contextually throughout history can be seen to support the notion that Boko Haram are indeed a terrorist 
organization and utilise similar tactics as other religiously motivated terrorists organizations modern day.  
Future prospects of Boko Haram 
 
It is highly probable that Boko Haram will continue to commit acts of terrorism and sectarian violence due to 
their ideological belief, current ability to gain funding, organizational structure, government deficits, ineffective 
counter-measures by the Nigerian government, economic marginality and ability to recruit (Anonymous, 2011; 
Soloman, 2012). Nigeria is a religiously heterogeneous, ethnically diverse, highly polarised country and the 
government is ineffective in dealing with non-state groups such as Boko Haram, with Devlin-Foltz (2010) 
describing the potential for this situation to be an incubator for international terrorism (Anonymous, 2011). 
Anonymous (2011) states that Boko Haram could springboard into the remaining parts of Nigeria and that 
eradication is increasingly difficult with the wider security force being infiltrated and corrupted by Boko Haram 
members (Roti, 2012b; Soloman, 2012). Any productive efforts to label this group a terrorist organization 
internationally and effectively counter the group will transpire when governments such as the Nigerian, 
American, Australian government or United Nations acknowledge and proscribe Boko Haram as one (Soloman, 
2012).  The Australian government should use resources to analyse the possible threat of Boko Haram to 
national security and interests and proscribe Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, to support possible counter 
terrorism efforts if intelligence continues to support a threat to western interests and links between Boko Haram, 
AQIM and al Shabaab. Although Australia in particular has not been specifically a target of an attack by Boko 
Haram western interests have, and there is that potential, and the Australian government should prepare and 
take this potential threat seriously. Terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula have quickly 
escalated from regional targets to western international targets (US House of Representatives Committee, 
2011). Adesoji (2011) asserts that due to the nature of global terrorism there is the ability for Boko Haram to 
gain support or be influenced by the current global jihadist movement. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Boko Haram can be best defined as a terrorist group, as opposed to religious fanatics or freedom fighters. 
Although seeming religiously motivated this group is also powerfully politically motivated. Boko Haram has 
risen from political discontent and a change in the political landscape of Nigeria. This group has committed acts 
of terrorism and several members are proscribed as terrorists, however the group is not as yet officially labelled 
as a terrorist organization. The Nigerian government is labelling the group criminals and a ‘murderous religious 
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group’, denying any benefits from the associated title and Islam as a legitimising tool.  Through the inspection 
of this sect’s philosophy and origins, and by comparing it against the Australian definition of terrorism and a 
proscribed terrorist organization AQIM, defining Boko Haram as a terrorist organization can be supported. The 
Australian government should take measures to proscribe Boko Haram as a terrorist group in the future in order 
to apply counter terrorism measures to protect Australia’s security if Boko Haram continues to evolve and join 
transnational Islamist movements. 
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